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Abstract 
This paper analyses differences in employment volatility in foreign-owned and domestic 
companies using firm-level data from 24 European countries. The presence of foreign-owned 
companies may lead to higher employment volatility because subsidiaries of multinational 
companies react more sensitively to changes in labour demand in host countries or because 
they are more exposed to external shocks. We assess the conditional employment volatility of 
firms with foreign and domestic owners using propensity score matching and find that it is 
higher in foreign-owned firms in about half of the countries that our study covers. In addition, 
we explore how and why labour demand elasticity differs between these two groups of 
companies. Our estimations indicate that labour demand can be either more or less elastic in 
subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinationals than in domestic enterprises, depending on the 
institutional environments of their home and host countries. When FDI originates from a 
region with a more flexible institutional environment then the elasticity of labour demand is 
smaller in absolute value in foreign-owned firms. In the opposite case the elasticity of labour 
demand is higher. A potential explanation for this empirical finding is that it is easier for 
multinational companies to substitute between factor inputs and therefore they have more 
flexibility than domestic firms in choosing which channels of adjustment to use.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
There is a long-running debate about the potential adverse side effects of the 
internationalisation of ownership structures and those of globalisation in general. The increase 
in employment volatility is one of the side effects usually depicted in a negative light, since it 
lessens job security (see e.g. Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Geishecker et al. (2012)).
1
 We 
study differences in employment volatility between firms with domestic and foreign workers 
in Europe. For this purpose, we use firm-level panel data from Bureau van Dijk Amadeus 
database spanning the years 2001-2009. The Amadeus dataset includes a detailed description 
of firms’ ownership structure, which enables us to disentangle companies by ownership type 
and to identify the number of subsidiaries for multinational and domestic enterprises.  
 
Rodrik (1997) in his book “Has globalization gone too far?” is seen as the first to argue 
forcefully that the labour demand of foreign-owned companies is more elastic, contributing to 
higher employment volatility and lower job security. He alleges that deeper international 
economic integration may make domestic workers more easily substitutable by foreign 
workers. Consequently, labour demand would become more wage (or own-price) elastic.   
 
Another reason why globalisation increases the elasticity of labour demand is that deepening 
international integration of production results in more elastic product demand. This is an 
often-cited finding from the empirical literature on international trade and FDI flows. 
According to the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand, more competition in the product 
markets (i.e. flatter product demand curves) should also lead to more elastic labour demand. 
Bhagwati (1996) stressed a related channel through which globalisation may have increased 
employment volatility when he pointed out that global economic integration has made product 
markets more volatile. Greater volatility of product demand should lead to greater volatility of 
labour demand as well, since the latter is derived from the former.  
 
An alternative view of the relationship between the international integration of production and 
the elasticity of labour demand is proposed by Hijzen and Swaim (2010). They argue that the 
impact of FDI on the elasticity of labour demand is theoretically ambiguous and hence 
ultimately an empirical issue. While the internationalisation of the production process is 
expected to increase the ability of firms to substitute between factor inputs, the elasticity of 
substitution is only one of several factors determining the own-price elasticity of labour 
demand. Globalisation, which is associated with greater capital mobility, will also tend to lead 
to a reduction in the cost share of labour. Making use of a decomposition of the determinants 
of labour demand elasticity into substitution and scale effects along the lines of Hamermesh 
(1993), Hijzen and Swaim (2010) demonstrate that a simultaneous increase in the constant-
output elasticity of substitution and a decrease in the cost share of labour in production will 
have offsetting effects on the total own-price elasticity of labour demand. The former will 
increase elasticity via the substitution effect, while the latter will decrease it via the scale 
effect. The result is that the net impact of globalisation can be either positive or negative, 
depending on which of the two effects dominates.  
 
Given the arguments outlined above, it is not a priori clear that a positive association exists 
between foreign ownership and employment volatility. The empirical evidence is mostly in 
favour of the existence of this relationship, but not universally so. Some examples in favour 
                                                 
1
 The other effects of globalisation remain beyond the scope of this paper. In particular, the paper does not seek 
to undermine the positive effects of FDI (see e.g. Borensztein et al (1998) on FDI and growth).  
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are studies by Bergin et al. (2009) and Levasseur (2010), which compare employment 
volatilities in specific offshoring industries in home and host countries. In Bergin et al.’s 
paper, the country pair is the USA and Mexico, and in Levasseur’s study, Germany is 
compared with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both of these articles focus on specific 
industries where the vertical integration of production is well documented and yield the result 
that employment is more volatile in the host country in an industry that specialises in 
subcontracting.  
 
However, studies analysing a wider spectrum of industries and incorporating services in 
addition to manufacturing do not always yield the result that globalisation is associated with 
increasing labour volatility. For example, an analysis by Buch and Schlotter (2013) using 
German industry-level data demonstrates that unconditional volatility of employment has 
exhibited a downward trend. According to this study, openness to trade and employment 
volatility are not significantly related across industries in Germany.  
 
Most of the research papers investigating the labour market impacts of offshoring (or FDI 
more particularly) focus on the elasticity of labour demand. As explained above, the flattening 
of the demand curve is one factor that can contribute to an increase in employment volatility. 
The results of these studies are inconclusive. The evidence in support of the hypothesis that an 
increase in offshoring leads to more elastic labour demand is provided by several studies.
2
 On 
the other hand, research which has used data from various European countries mostly does not 
support this hypothesis.
3
 Among studies using plant-level or firm-level data, the only case 
where the higher labour demand elasticity of foreign multinationals has found empirical 
support is in Ireland (Görg et al., 2009). 
 
The purpose of our study is to assess the differences in employment volatility between firms 
with domestic and foreign owners. Using the standard framework of labour demand and 
supply, we show that the differences in total employment volatility can be caused either by 
the foreign-owned firms’ different elasticity of labour demand or by their different exposure 
to economic shocks. We assess the conditional employment volatilities of firms with foreign 
and domestic owners using propensity score matching, which enables us to control for 
differences in firm characteristics such as age, size, capital intensity, labour productivity, 
ownership concentration, and number of subsidiaries. A comparison of conditional 
employment volatilities implies that foreign-owned firms tend to have systematically higher 
employment volatility than domestically owned counterparts with similar characteristics, 
although this difference is not statistically significant for all the countries that our study 
covers.   
 
Regarding the elasticity of labour demand, we do not find evidence to support Rodrik’s 
(1997) conjecture described above. The system GMM estimations of labour demand functions 
across 18 European countries indicate that the wage elasticity of labour demand is mostly not 
significantly different between foreign and domestically owned enterprises. For the few 
countries where the differences are significant the elasticity is not always larger in foreign-
owned firms. The main focus of our analysis is on assessing the role that labour market 
institutions play in this context.  
 
                                                 
2
 Supporting evidence can be found in Slaughter (2001) on the US data; Fabbri et al (2003) for the UK; and Görg 
et al. (2009) for Ireland.  
3
 Examples include Barba Navaretti et al. (2003); Buch and Lipponer (2010); and Hakkala et al. (2010) 
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The results of two earlier studies indicate that the effect of offshoring or foreign ownership on 
the elasticity of labour demand is dependent on labour market institutions. Barba Navaretti et 
al. (2003) show that long-term wage elasticity of labour demand is lower in multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) than in domestic firms and the ratio of the elasticities of MNEs and NEs 
is larger in countries with a stricter institutional environment. They argue that MNEs manage 
to bypass the regulations in a strict regulatory environment and conclude that “labour market 
regulations are quite irrelevant to the labour market behaviour of MNEs” (Barba Navaretti et 
al. (2003), p. 718). The analysis of Hijzen and Swaim (2010) indicates that offshoring is 
associated with higher labour demand elasticity only in countries with relatively weak 
employment protection legislation, whereas they detect no significant effects for countries 
with more regulated labour markets.  
 
In comparison to the earlier research, we take a step further and investigate the role of labour 
market institutions in a bilateral context by assessing the effects of differences in the 
institutional environment in the home and host countries of MNEs. We find that labour 
demand can be either more or less elastic in subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinationals than 
in domestic enterprises, depending on these institutional differences. When FDI originates 
from a region with more flexible institutions then the elasticity of labour demand is smaller in 
absolute value in foreign-owned firms. In the opposite case the elasticity of labour demand is 
higher. A potential explanation for this empirical finding is that it is easier for multinational 
companies to substitute between factor inputs and so they have more flexibility than domestic 
firms in choosing which channels of adjustment to use.  
 
When MNEs need to adjust costs in response to economic shocks, then in the presence of 
strong restrictions on the adjustment of employment it is easier for them to alter other 
production costs or output prices and leave labour costs unadjusted. A multinational 
production network should be associated with easier adjustment via other margins than is the 
case for companies that have only domestic operations. In addition, MNEs can respond to 
shocks by adjusting employment in other locations abroad. If it is necessary to change 
employment in response to economic shocks then they can shift adjustments to countries or 
regions where it is easier to adjust. They can change employment mostly at home when the 
labour market there is more flexible or shift the main bulk of adjustment to foreign affiliates 
when the local institutions in the host countries favour this. 
 
It is worth noting that we use a similar explanation for our empirical findings to that evoked 
by Rodrik (1997). He asserted that multinational enterprises have larger elasticity of 
substitution between production factors and this should increase their elasticity of labour 
demand. We add another layer to this argument as our empirical estimates imply that this 
greater ease of substituting between different inputs can also result in smaller elasticity of 
labour demand, depending on labour market institutions. Differences in institutional 
environment can lead to a dual outcome: the presence of MNEs can have an amplifying effect 
on the elasticity of labour demand in countries with flexible labour market institutions, 
whereas it can have a dampening effect in countries with rigid institutions.   
 
An alternative, though related, explanation for this empirical finding is that multinational 
firms choose the host countries where they will establish subsidiaries by looking at the labour 
market institutions: if MNEs operate in sectors characterised by highly volatile demand then 
they are more likely to move to countries with a flexible institutional environment. The 
formalisation of how flexible labour markets act as a comparative advantage is provided e.g. 
in Cunat and Melitz (2012).  
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The paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the theoretical model deriving 
the decomposition of employment volatility. The third section provides an overview of the 
Bureau van Dijk Amadeus firm-level data that we employ for the analysis. In the fourth 
section, we give an overview of unconditional and conditional employment volatilities for 
foreign and domestically owned firms. Section 5 focuses on estimating labour demand 
equations for foreign and domestically owned firms and investigating the role of labour 
market institutions. The last section summarises. 
 
 
2. Decomposition of employment volatility  
 
The subsidiaries of foreign-owned enterprises can have higher volatility than local companies 
for two reasons. First, they may be exposed to more volatile shocks, which can then be 
transferred into more volatile labour demand, and second, they may behave differently from 
local enterprises as they can react to shocks of similar size more or less strongly by adjusting 
labour. This section will derive a decomposition of employment volatility into two 
subcomponents: a) a function of exogenous economic shocks; and b) a function of the 
elasticities of labour supply and demand. This decomposition will enable us to demonstrate 
that employment volatility is positively related to the elasticity of labour demand as long as 
labour supply is not perfectly inelastic. This can be assumed to be the case if the subject of the 
analysis is a firm, as in the current study.  
 
We build on the approach of Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004) along the lines of Hamermesh (1993) to decompose employment volatility. Let us 
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with diminishing returns to scale where capital is 
fixed in the short-term and normalised to one: 
 
           (1) 
 
where Y denotes output, A is the parameter capturing technological progress and L denotes 
labour, while 0 < β < 1. Profit maximisation under perfect competition in all markets yields: 
 
              (2) 
 
where W stands for wages, p is product price and the term pAβ is marginal revenue product, 
which captures exogenous price and productivity shocks. Solving for L and defining labour 
demand as L
D
 results in the following labour demand equation: 
 
    
 
   
 
       
     (3) 
 
Given that the labour demand elasticity equals 1 / (β-1) in this case and defining ηLL as the 
absolute value of the wage elasticity of labour demand lets us rewrite equation (3) as: 
 
    
 
   
 
    
     (3’) 
 
Let us assume the following labour supply function: 
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where ηS denotes the wage elasticity of labour supply. The equilibrium employment and wage 
can then be expressed as follows: 
 
        
                  (5) 
 
        
                (6) 
 
Taking natural logarithms of both sides of equations (5) and (6) (a monotonic transformation) 
yields: 
 
 
                              (7) 
 
                                     (8) 
 
where w = ln(W) and l = ln(L). 
 
Treating marginal revenue product as a random variable, we can express the variance of 
equilibrium employment and wages by building on equations (7) and (8) as follows: 
 
                                       (9) 
 
                                     (10) 
 
Equation (9) implies that employment volatility can be expressed as a combination of two 
components. The first part, in square brackets, captures volatility in employment due to 
changes in labour demand elasticity. Given non-zero finite elasticity of labour supply, the 
elasticity of labour demand is positively related to employment volatility, ceteris paribus. The 
second part captures volatility in employment due to changes in the exposure to economic 
shocks. The more exposed a firm is to external shocks or the higher the variation in marginal 
revenue product is, the higher its employment volatility is. 
 
Note that when the labour supply is perfectly inelastic then changes in the elasticity of labour 
demand do not affect employment volatility. On the other hand, equation (10) implies that 
when the labour supply is perfectly elastic then changes in the elasticity of labour demand do 
not affect wage volatility. In general, the distribution of volatility between wages and 
employment depends on the slope of the labour supply curve. The more elastic it is, the larger 
employment volatility is relative to wage volatility, given a similar demand schedule and 
exogenous shocks to labour demand. Since labour market rigidities make the labour supply 
less elastic, it can be expected that employment will be more volatile in countries with 
flexible labour regulations, ceteris paribus.  
 
The decomposition given in equation (9) illustrates that foreign-owned companies may have 
higher employment volatility because they react more sensitively to wage changes in a host 
country or because they are more exposed to external shocks. The latter might well be the 
case since foreign-owned MNEs are more likely to operate in several markets and to be hit by 
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shocks more frequently than domestically owned enterprises.
4
 However, multinationals may 
also be faced by a more dispersed structure of shocks, so whether they are more or less 
exposed to a volatile economic environment is an empirical issue that depends on the cross-
country correlation of shocks.  
 
 
3. The data 
 
We use an Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk, see https://amadeus.bvdinfo.com) firm-level panel 
dataset that covers a large set of European countries and spans the years 2001-2009. Amadeus 
data includes information about the balance sheets and profit/loss statements of firms and 
detailed information on the ownership structure.  
 
Our initial goal was to cover all the EU27 countries, but the set of countries was reduced to 18 
because of data availability. The Amadeus data on Greece and Lithuania do not cover 
employment costs while the data on Ireland do not cover employment volumes. The Amadeus 
data on Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta do not have 
enough observations to be suitable for econometric analysis. Our analysis includes Norway in 
addition to the EU member states. The default dataset covers 18 countries, 170 thousand firms 
and in total more than a million observations. In some cases, like when data on wage costs is 
not necessary for the analysis, the set of countries covered is larger. The variables for the 
empirical analysis are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Employment  
(empl) 
Number of employees, head counts 
Wage 
(rwage) 
GDP deflator* deflated employment costs divided by employment 
Output 
(rturn) 
GDP deflator* deflated turnover (operational revenue for Denmark, Norway, UK)  
Foreign-owned 
enterprise 
(FOE) 
Foreign versus domestically owned enterprises (FOEs; DOEs), dummy variable. A firm is 
considered to be foreign-owned if its global ultimate owner is a foreigner (subsidiary) or 
its largest shareholder is a foreigner (associate). Ownership is time-invariant and fixed in 
the year 2009.  
Age Firm’s age in years 
No of subsidiaries  Number of recorded subsidiaries 
No of 
shareholders  
Number of recorded shareholders 
Peer’s 
employment  
Employment of the business group or the largest recorded owner 
Capital intensity  Total fixed assets per employee in real terms 
Labour 
productivity 
Deflated turnover divided by employment 
Notes: The GDP deflator is taken from Eurostat and is at a 2-digit NACE 2008 level.  
 
The ownership data are often missing in the Amadeus dataset. For some countries like 
Romania and Slovakia the data are only available for a small number of companies. The 
                                                 
4
 The focus in the current study is on comparing foreign and domestically owned companies. Practically all of 
the former are subsidiaries or affiliates of multinational companies. Although some of the domestically owned 
firms are also multinationals, the majority of firms in this group are local companies. Thus, as a group, foreign-
owned firms can be expected to be more exposed to shocks.  
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number of observations across the dynamic dimension of the dataset is smaller than average 
for Germany as the years 2007-2009 are missing for almost all the firms. In general, larger 
firms tend to be overrepresented in the Amadeus sample in comparison to the whole 
population of firms.  
 
We also impose filters to remove possibly erroneous observations and make the dataset more 
comparable across countries. These filters differ for matching and dynamic panel data 
analysis and these differences are discussed in the sections that cover these topics. Country-
by-country estimations use monetary variables in their original currency, while estimations 
with pooled data across countries employ monetary variables transformed into euros
5
.  
 
Appendix 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for foreign and domestically owned 
enterprises (FOEs and DOEs) separately for countries from Western Europe and from Central 
and Eastern Europe. The foreign-owned firms tend to be larger, to pay higher wages, to have 
higher capital intensity and labour productivity, to have more concentrated ownership and to 
operate more often in the manufacturing sector. In total, 18% of firms are foreign-owned in 
the final sample, while 30% of employment originates from foreign-owned companies. The 
sample of enterprises from Western Europe contains some very large firms, which make the 
samples of WE and CEE differ much more in the mean values of the variables analysed than 
in the medians.  
 
Figure 1 presents the origin of foreign investment from the host country perspective. FDI in 
EU countries mostly originates from other EU countries and is highly concentrated in terms of 
origins, with Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK being the main home countries. 
Outside the EU the main country of origin is the USA. Central and Eastern Europe is an 
important recipient of FDI from Western Europe but the FDI flows from Central and Eastern 
Europe to other EU countries are modest. 
 
Figure 1. Country of origin of foreign enterprises (2005) 
                                                 
5
 The source of the exchange rates is the European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse: annual average 
bilateral exchange rates. [http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018794] 
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Notes: Foreign ownership is weighted by employment. See International Standard Codes for the Representation 
of the Names of Countries (version 2002) for the country abbreviations.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Amadeus dataset. 
 
 
Our dataset imposes some limitations on what we can or cannot test. First, we cannot observe 
firm entry and exit in our data, which means that we can investigate firms’ employment 
adjustment only via the intensive margin. Second, we do not cover employment across 
different skill groups as we only have data on total wages and employment. Third, our 
database consists of the balance sheets and profit/loss statements on a yearly basis but only 
includes ownership data for the year 2009, so it is possible that the firm ownership variable is 
subject to measurement error.  
 
Trade and foreign ownership are sometimes difficult to disentangle. For example, part of 
production can be outsourced abroad to another company or a subsidiary can be established 
abroad to do this work within a business group. Offshoring is usually defined as a change in 
the supplier of intermediate inputs and services from a domestic one to a foreign one. 
Offshoring can be international outsourcing, which means importing goods from other firms, 
or it can be the relocation of a firm’s own production so that some parts of the value-added 
chain are produced abroad within an affiliate or subsidiary. This relocation is also called in-
house offshoring. OECD (2007) notes that offshoring via the establishment of a new affiliate 
is more common when OECD countries are offshoring to other developed countries. When 
OECD countries offshore to less developed countries the most common type of offshoring is 
usually subcontracting. Most of the host countries covered in this study are OECD countries, 
meaning that in-house offshoring should be the most common type of offshoring to these 
countries and this is what our database captures. 
 
BE
FI
FR
DE
IT
NL
NO
PT
ES
SE
GB
BG
CZ
EE
PL
RO
SK
SI
US
JP
CH
other EU
other
H
o
m
e
 c
o
u
n
tr
y
BE FI FR DE IT NL NO PT ES SE GB BG CZ EE PL RO SK SI
Host country
11 
 
 
4. Unconditional and conditional employment volatility 
 
In this section we will look at employment volatility across 24 European countries
6
, 
differentiating between foreign and domestically owned enterprises. We start out by 
comparing the unconditional employment volatilities of FOEs and DOEs. This comparison 
performs a simple test as to whether firm-level employment volatility differs for these two 
firm groups, i.e. whether the overall volatility differs in the left-hand side of equation (9). 
Volatility is measured as a coefficient of variation (CV) for the time period 2001-2009. For 
better comparability, firms with fewer than 5 observations are excluded.   
 
Next, to account for firm heterogeneity, we estimate conditional employment volatilities. We 
use propensity score matching with the nearest neighbour and a caliper (maximum propensity 
score distance) algorithm. As it is sometimes difficult to find a common support for treatment 
and artificial counterfactual groups, we match the three nearest neighbours and introduce a 
caliper of 0.05 or 0.10, meaning the three nearest neighbours are selected within a propensity 
score of 5% or 10%. A caliper of 10% is used in country-by-country analysis, and a caliper of 
5% in the analysis of country groups. We use matching with replacement, meaning that the 
same firms from the artificial counterfactual can be used more than once as a match. (See 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion of options for matching algorithms and 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for psmatch2 module for Stata). 
 
We use control variables from 2005 and estimate the conditional volatility as a cross-section 
over this period of analysis. The control variables are: logarithm of firm age, logarithm of 
firm employment, number of subsidiaries, logarithm of number of shareholders, peer group 
employment, logarithm of capital per employee, logarithm of labour productivity, industry 
dummies (NACE Rev 2, at 2-digit level) and country dummies. 
 
Table 2 presents unconditional sales turnover and employment volatilities for FOEs and 
DOEs for each country separately. In addition, it gives a picture of the differences between 
conditional and unconditional volatilities for these two groups of enterprises. It can be 
observed that for the majority of countries unconditional sales turnover and employment 
volatilities are higher in FOEs than in DOEs. However, this is not a uniform result, since these 
differences are negative and statistically significant for several countries: turnover volatility is 
statistically significantly higher among domestic firms in France, Greece, Spain, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, while employment volatility is higher among domestic firms in 
Greece and Spain. (Note that the Amadeus dataset is not a random sample and the estimated 
unconditional volatilities may not be representative of the whole population of firms.)  
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 We were able to increase the set of countries analysed here by adding Austria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia and Lithuania as the employment and ownership data for these countries was available for a substantial 
number of firms, unlike the wage costs needed for the forthcoming sections. 
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Table 2. Unconditional and conditional volatilities by countries: Subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals vs. domestic firms 
  
Unconditional volatility Conditional volatility 
  
FOE DOE 
Difference 
(FOE – DOE) 
Difference after 
matching 
(FOE – DOE) 
No. of obs. 
 
Volatility of sales turnover 
 
Austria 0.227 0.217 0.010  200 
Belgium 0.354 0.319 0.035+ 0.046* 7115 
Denmark 0.223 0.233 -0.010 0.005 4002 
Finland 0.396 0.39 0.005 0.033* 4075 
France 0.35 0.368 -0.019+ -0.011 6006 
Germany 0.291 0.251 0.040+ 0.045* 4463 
Greece 0.375 0.432 -0.057+ -0.047* 1459 
Italy 0.368 0.37 -0.002 0.018* 16730 
Netherlands 0.338 0.299 0.039+ 0.046* 2520 
Norway 0.442 0.433 0.010 0.048* 23331 
Portugal 0.301 0.337 -0.036 -0.007 1014 
Spain 0.439 0.453 -0.014+ 0.041* 91612 
Sweden 0.417 0.384 0.033+ 0.045* 16138 
UK 0.388 0.374 0.014+ 0.013* 24459 
Bulgaria 0.642 0.611 0.031+ 0.022 1502 
Czech Rep. 0.388 0.411 -0.024+ -0.015 3525 
Estonia 0.549 0.564 -0.016 0.002 2060 
Hungary 0.444 0.472 -0.028+  148 
Latvia 0.664 0.671 -0.007 -0.001 1262 
Lithuania 0.515 0.502 0.013 0.019 2231 
Poland 0.416 0.362 0.054+ 0.041* 11117 
Romania 0.891 0.67 0.221+ 0.161* 679 
Slovakia 0.501 0.444   58 
Slovenia 0.379 0.381 -0.003 0.008 2087 
 
Volatility of employment 
 
Austria 0.187 0.182 0.005 0.042* 682 
Belgium 0.25 0.225 0.024+ 0.029* 7116 
Denmark 0.162 0.153 0.010 0.016* 4211 
Finland 0.265 0.264 0.0004 0.011 3853 
France 0.239 0.248 -0.009 -0.009 5453 
Germany 0.194 0.159 0.035+ 0.036* 3867 
Greece 0.067 0.120 -0.053+ -0.056* 1464 
Italy 0.36 0.323 0.037+ 0.034* 15990 
Netherlands 0.285 0.27 0.015 -0.011 2273 
Norway 0.295 0.285 0.009 0.019* 17611 
Portugal 0.18 0.197 -0.017 -0.017 656 
Spain 0.286 0.298 -0.012+ 0.010 90395 
Sweden 0.324 0.308 0.016+ 0.029* 16169 
UK 0.281 0.26 0.020+ 0.017* 24323 
Bulgaria 0.461 0.445 0.016 -0.017 1523 
Czech Rep. 0.318 0.287 0.031+ 0.038* 3378 
Estonia 0.311 0.317 -0.006 -0.006 2003 
Hungary 0.157 0.208 -0.051  79 
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Latvia 0.332 0.338 -0.005 -0.01 1241 
Lithuania 0.35 0.317 0.033+ 0.012 2233 
Poland 0.245 0.189 0.056+ 0.033* 10778 
Romania 0.446 0.399 0.047+ 0.039 680 
Slovakia 0.353 0.359 -0.006  58 
Slovenia 0.242 0.251 -0.01 -0.005 2180 
Notes: Volatility is estimated as a coefficient of variation (CV) over the years 2001-2009, control variables are 
from 2005. Firms with fewer than 5 observations are excluded, except for Denmark where firms with a minimum 
of 4 observations were used. Conditional volatilities are not estimated for some countries due to the small sample 
size. +
 
indicates statistical significance of the difference in unconditional volatility (based on a t-test). * indicates 
statistical significance of the difference in conditional volatility based on bootstrapped standard errors.  
 
The estimation of conditional volatilities enables us to compare FOEs and DOEs with similar 
characteristics. The estimated figures presented in Table 2 imply that FOEs tend to have 
larger employment volatility than similar DOEs. The difference in the volatility of sales 
turnover in favour of FOEs is significantly positive for 11 countries out of the 19 for which 
these estimates could be assessed. (We could not apply propensity score matching for some 
countries as there was an insufficient number of observations and a lack of common support 
for matching.) The employment volatility is statistically significantly higher in FOEs than in 
DOEs in 10 countries out of the 19. There is only one country, Greece, where this relationship 
is the other way around, i.e. the conditional volatilities of sales turnover and employment are 
statistically significantly higher among DOEs than among FOEs.  
 
Next, we compare sales turnover and employment volatilities for two subsets of the pooled 
datafile: Western European and Central and Eastern European countries.
7
 These two groups 
are differentiated throughout the paper as the income levels and institutional backgrounds 
differ substantially between these country groups. We discuss the institutional differences in 
more detail in Section 5. In addition, we assess volatility separately for services and 
manufacturing companies. The estimated volatilities presented in Table 3 are indicative of the 
existence of the following regularities or “stylised facts”. First, volatility of sales turnover is 
larger than volatility of employment. (This is a standard result in the related literature which 
can be explained by inelastic labour demand.) Second, unconditional volatilities of sales 
turnover and employment are higher in services than in manufacturing. Third, conditional on 
firm characteristics, both sales turnover and employment are more volatile in the subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals than in domestically owned companies.
8
 
  
 
 
  
                                                 
7
 WE countries are: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. CEE countries are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The same groups of countries are used in the forthcoming section on labour demand equations. 
8
 Although it is not the aim of this paper to compare multinationals with domestic and foreign owners, we can 
still distinguish these groups in our data. The conditional employment volatility is higher among foreign-owned 
multinationals than among domestically owned multinationals in manufacturing, while the conditional difference 
is not statistically significant or becomes negative in services.  
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Table 3. Unconditional and conditional volatilities by country groups: Subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals vs. domestic firms   
 
Unconditional volatility Conditional volatility 
   
Difference 
Difference 
after 
matching No. of 
obs. FOE  DOE (FOE – DOE) (FOE – DOE) 
Volatility of sales turnover 
WE Manufacturing 0.336 0.344 -0.008+ 0.024* 47124 
WE Services 0.428 0.449 -0.022+ 0.037* 152066 
WE difference (services – 
manufacturing) 
0.092+ 0.105+    
CEE Manufacturing 0.441 0.384 0.057+ 0.031* 7486 
CEE Services 0.503 0.449 0.054+ 0.037* 14048 
CEE difference (services 
– manufacturing) 
0.062+ 0.065+    
Volatility of employment 
WE Manufacturing 0.236 0.236 -0.0003 0.023* 45705 
WE Services 0.302 0.306 -0.004+ 0.021* 143462 
WE difference (services – 
manufacturing) 0.066+ 0.070+       
CEE Manufacturing 0.285 0.224 0.062+ 0.034* 7362 
CEE Services 0.326 0.245 0.081+ 0.030* 13745 
CEE difference (services 
– manufacturing) 0.041+ 0.021+    
Notes: See notes for Table 2 and footnote no 6. 
 
 
 
The results for unconditional and conditional volatility are somewhat different in the groups 
of WE and CEE countries. The FOEs are less volatile than DOEs in WE countries before firm 
characteristics are controlled for and this difference reverses to become positive after the 
control for firm characteristics. On the other hand, foreign-owned firms are more volatile than 
domestically owned firms before and after firm characteristics in CEE are controlled for and 
the difference in volatility diminishes by roughly half after matching. A possible reason for 
these diverging outcomes is that foreign firms have somewhat different characteristics in WE 
and CEE, and also that foreign firms operate in less volatile industries in WE and in more 
volatile areas in CEE. This finding is in accordance with the implications from the theoretical 
literature (Cunat and Melitz (2012)) that more flexible labour market institutions in CEE may 
attract more volatile FDI.  
 
Appendix 2 presents the probit models behind these propensity score estimates. The appendix 
shows that the “propensity to be a foreign-owned firm” is often different in WE and CEE in 
terms of industry variables, meaning there are differences in the concentration of FDI to 
certain industries. For example there is relatively more FDI in labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries in the CEE countries (textiles and wearing apparel, wood products and furniture 
manufacturing) and in some volatile manufacturing industries (non-metallic mineral products, 
fabricated metal products, electrical equipment, and motor vehicle manufacturing). The 
15 
 
electrical equipment industry is one of the largest in the sample and one of the most volatile, 
like it is in the study of Cunat and Melitz (2012). 
 
Second, these country groups differ in the conditional employment volatility of foreign firms. 
While there are hardly any differences in conditional turnover volatility between WE and 
CEE, the difference in conditional employment volatility is somewhat higher among foreign 
firms in CEE than foreign firms in WE. A “similar” foreign firm has 7-8% higher sales 
turnover volatility in WE than a DOE does and 8% higher sales turnover volatility in CEE, 
whereas a “similar” foreign firm has 7-10% higher employment volatility in WE and 12-15% 
higher employment volatility in CEE. This indicates that foreign firms are more prone to 
volatile employment in CEE than in WE.  
 
The following section will investigate whether differences in labour demand elasticity could 
explain the higher employment volatility of foreign firms. 
 
 
5. Elasticity of labour demand  
5.1. Estimation methodology 
 
We estimate the following labour demand equation, assuming that capital is fixed in the short-
run and that employment is adjusted on a given output, yit (a similar approach to Barba 
Navaretti (2003); and Görg et al. (2009)): 
 
itstititit ywllit    21110                                    (11) 
 
where lit is log(employment) in firm i at time t (t=1, …,9); wit is log(real labour cost per 
employee); yit is log(real output); τt notes time dummies and γs sector dummies (NACE 2-digit 
industries). Estimations covering the data from multiple countries include time dummies for 
each country, i.e. time*country dummies. Sector dummies are included in the base 
specification. However, for some estimations sector dummies were excluded when 
specification tests indicated poor fit of the specification or unfeasible coefficients were 
produced. Nominal variables are deflated by 2-digit industry level GDP deflators to obtain 
real values, see also the discussion in the data section. The coefficient α1 captures firms’ 
employment persistence (speed of adjustment = 1 – α1). The coefficient β1 measures short-
term wage elasticity of labour demand and β2 short-term output elasticity of labour demand. 
Long-term elasticities can be found by dividing short-term elasticities by the speed of 
adjustment. 
 
We introduce the interaction terms with foreign ownership to test for the differences in the 
labour demand elasticities of domestic and foreign firms: 
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                           (12) 
 
where FOi takes the value “1” when a company is foreign-owned and the value “0” when a 
company is domestically owned. Coefficients of the interactive variables capture the 
differences between FOEs and DOEs in employment persistence and short-term labour 
demand elasticities. If the speed of employment adjustment is higher in FOEs than in DOEs, 
we will observe the coefficient α2 to be negative and statistically significant. If the short-term 
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wage elasticity of labour demand is higher in absolute terms for FOEs, we will observe 
coefficient β3 to be negative and statistically significant. Similarly, if the short-term output 
elasticity of labour demand is higher in FOEs than in DOEs, β4 will be positive and 
statistically significant. 
 
 
5.2. Elasticity of labour demand: Differences between FOEs and DOEs across countries 
 
Regression equation (12) is estimated by the system GMM method
9
 developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We employ a two-step system GMM 
estimation with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
10
 The lagged employment and real 
turnover are treated as endogenous variables in the model; real wages are treated as 
endogenous, pre-determined or exogeneous dependent on the coefficients and specification 
tests. We choose the dynamic form of our labour demand equation and the set of instruments 
from the serial correlation tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the Hansen test for 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). We imply Hansen’s test for overidentifying 
restrictions for testing the validity of the joint set of instruments. As is usual for system GMM 
estimations, the overidentification tests tend to reject the null hypothesis of no 
overidentification in large and heterogeneous samples. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that 
rejection takes place too often in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Our pooled sample of all 
countries is relatively large, which increases the probability that the tests of overidentifying 
restrictions are subject to type I error. The tests for second-order serial correlation are also 
subject to the criticism that they are inclined to type I error in samples with large cross-
sections relative to the time dimension. 
 
OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimations were also carried out to assess the sensitivity of the 
estimated coefficients to the various estimation techniques. The estimated coefficients for 
other explanatory variables (except for the lagged dependent variable) tend to be between the 
OLS and FE for wages and output, and are often larger than the OLS and FE for ownership-
interacted wages and output. The endogeneity of wage and output against employment in 
DOEs and FOEs should be accounted for by the system GMM estimation as most of the 
Hansen tests applied to our regressions do not reject the null hypothesis of no 
overidentification of instruments.  
 
Our first choice for the dynamic form is that specified in equation (12). If the specification 
tests described above reject the assumption of no second-order autocorrelation or the validity 
of instruments, or the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable does not lie within the 
brackets of fixed effects and OLS estimation, we use the specification where the second lag of 
the dependent variable is added to the RHS. Since the time dimension of the sample is 9 years 
at maximum, we include at most 2 lags of the dependent variable. If the specification tests and 
OLS and FE brackets are not satisfied for this dynamic form either, the third specification 
                                                 
9
 OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimations were also carried out. FE estimates are biased in dynamic panels 
(Nickell, 1981). Since employment and its lagged value are positively correlated, the FE estimate for the lagged 
dependent variable is downward biased. This also implies that the OLS estimate of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is upward biased. Thus the OLS and FE estimates of the lagged term determine a lower and 
upper bound for the estimated speed of adjustment. Note that the same boundaries could be applied for the other 
control variables included in the model only under assumption of their exogeneity, which in our specification is 
not valid. See Bond (2002) for this discussion. Difference GMM is not used in this paper as employment, output 
and wages are highly persistent time-series and hence their levels provide weak instruments for differences.  
10
 We use the xtabond2 command for Stata, see Roodman (2009). 
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adds the first lag of wages and output to the RHS. As a result the applied dynamic form varies 
from country to country.  
 
We also experimented with various sets of instruments and could not find a common set of 
instruments that would have been suitable for all countries. The differences in dynamic form 
and the set of instruments arise from different properties of the time-series across countries, 
cross-country differences in the time-dimension and object-dimension of the panel, and 
possibly also from differences in the institutions that shape the endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables.  
 
We start out by estimating the labour demand relationship as specified in equation (12) 
separately for each country. Only firms with at least 5 consecutive observations for 
employment, wages and output, and without any gap in these series are included in the 
estimation sample. Firms that show yearly growth of 100% or more in employment, wages or 
output are excluded and taken as measurement error or merger/acquisition, which we cannot 
control for. There are 18 countries covered in this and the following sub-sections. The 
estimated effects for the interactive variables imply whether the elasticity of labour demand is 
different for FOEs and DOEs in each country. The estimated coefficients for specification 
(12) are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C. Estimates for the interactive variables 
capturing the differences between short-term wage and output elasticities and speed of 
adjustment are insignificant for the majority of the countries covered. However, when the 
estimates indicate a faster speed of adjustment for foreign firms, it is always accompanied by 
greater (absolute) wage and output elasticity, while slower speeds come with lower elasticity. 
Consequently, all three indicators imply either greater or lower flexibility of labour 
adjustment for foreign firms.  
 
Appendix C indicates that the speed of adjustment of foreign firms is statistically significantly 
higher in manufacturing in Italy and Slovenia and in services in Portugal and Bulgaria. The 
opposite is found in manufacturing in France and services in the Netherlands. The estimated 
coefficients on FO*log(rwage) are statistically significantly negative (implying larger 
elasticity in absolute terms in FOE) for manufacturing in Belgium and Italy, whereas they are 
statistically significantly positive for services in Finland and the Netherlands. The short-term 
output elasticity of labour demand is statistically significantly lower for foreign firms in 
manufacturing in France and in services in Finland and the Netherlands. Thus, country-by-
country regressions do not yield conclusive results for the difference in labour demand 
between domestic and foreign companies. Grouping countries together in the groups of 
Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe as in the previous section does not reveal any 
differences in foreign or domestic firms either (see Table 4).  
 
There are even fewer statistically significant differences between domestic and foreign firms 
in long-run elasticities (see Appendix D). Long-run wage or turnover elasticity is found to be 
lower for foreign firms (in absolute value) in services in Finland and Spain, and higher in 
services in Italy. The speed of adjustment is on average higher in services and long-run 
elasticities are higher in manufacturing, which is to be expected given the smaller firm size in 
services and the higher substitutability of labour in manufacturing. The results by country 
groups presented in Table 4 do not indicate any significant differences between foreign and 
domestic firms in long-run elasticities either.  
 
 
Table 4. Labour demand estimates of FOEs and DOEs, 2001-2009: country groups 
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 Western Europe Central and Eastern Europe 
 Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
 GMM SYS (3 .) 
wage pre 
GMM SYS (3 5) 
wage pre 
GMM-SYS (3 .) 
wage pre 
GMM SYS (3 .) 
wage ex 
L.log(empl) 0.853*** 0.611*** 0.856*** 0.737*** 
 (0.081) (0.153) (0.101) (0.218) 
L2.log(empl) 0.011    
 (0.077)    
Log(rwage) -0.546*** -0.382*** -0.291** -0.675*** 
 (0.085) (0.136) (0.125) (0.242) 
L.Log(rwage) 0.461***    
 (0.082)    
Log(rturn) 0.654*** 0.250** 0.274*** 0.504*** 
 (0.064) (0.103) (0.087) (0.168) 
L.Log(rturn) -0.534***    
 (0.085)    
L.FO* log(empl) -0.073 0.207 -0.014 -0.082 
 (0.112) (0.134) (0.092) (0.265) 
L2.FO* log(empl) 0.087    
 (0.100)    
FO*log(rwage) 0.018 0.120 0.106 0.255 
 (0.072) (0.165) (0.102) (0.223) 
L. FO*log(rwage) -0.034    
 (0.073)    
FO*log(rturn) -0.001 -0.177 -0.067 -0.105 
 (0.066) (0.134) (0.078) (0.188) 
L. FO*log(rturn) 0.003    
 (0.055)    
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year*country dummies yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 232058 718913 30648 58701 
# of groups 41004 114224 4945 9721 
Min obs. gr. 2 3 3 3 
Mean obs. gr. 5.659 6.294 6.198 6.039 
Max obs. gr. 7 8 8 8 
# of instruments 211 188 182 158 
Hansen p 0.123 0.441 0.601 0.555 
AR(1) test -8.056 -3.144 -7.809 -2.958 
AR(2) test 0.392 1.281 -1.192 -0.926 
FDI in sample 0.187 0.158 0.416 0.334 
Notes: System GMM estimations. Dependent variable: log(employment), 2001-2009. Two-step estimators with 
Windmeijer-corrected cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Lagged employment and turnover are treated 
as endogenous; wages are treated as endogenous, pre-determined or exogenous dependent on specification tests. 
Lag length of GMM type instruments are reported at the top of the column. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. See footnote no 6 for the list of host 
countries covered. 
 
 
Overall we do not find similar conclusive results for foreign firms’ higher speed of adjustment 
to those found by Barba Navaretti et al. (2003). However, they used difference GMM for 
estimating the labour demand equations, which might be poorly identified due to weak 
instruments in estimations with highly persistent variables (see the discussion by Bond 
(2002)). Our results are in line with the findings of Buch and Lipponer (2010) and Hakkala et 
al. (2010), who find no statistically significant differences between the labour demand of 
foreign and domestic firms in Germany and Sweden. However, the results seem to be 
country-specific, as in some countries the differences between foreign and domestic firms are 
large and statistically significant. French and Spanish foreign firms, for example, seem to 
behave much more inelastically than their domestic counterparts, and it is worth noting that 
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these countries have relatively strict employment protection legislation. The remaining 
sections of the paper investigate whether the differences between domestic and foreign firms 
can be explained by the home and host country labour market institutions. 
 
 
5.3. Elasticity of labour demand: Labour market institutions 
 
This section analyses whether labour market institutions could have an effect on labour 
demand elasticities and whether institutions could explain the differences in elasticities of 
FOEs and DOEs. We separate the sample into domestically and foreign-owned firms and 
analyse how labour market institutions affect the elasticity of labour demand in the two 
groups. For this purpose, we introduce interaction terms with measures of labour market 
regulations to the labour demand equation and estimate the following specification on two 
subsamples, DOE and FOE: 
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where INSTct denotes the measure of labour market regulations in country c at time t and ηc 
denotes a set of country dummies.  
 
We include two measures of labour market regulations in the regressions: union density, 
which is based on statistics from the OECD and ICTWSS database by Visser (2011), and the 
OECD’s employment protection legislation (EPL) index (Version 2 published in 2009).11 
Appendix E presents the average values of these measures for 2001-2009 across the countries 
covered and the USA. Despite significant differences in income and wage levels within 
Europe (see Appendix F), the strictness of employment protection legislation does not diverge 
much across European countries according to the OECD measure. The UK stands out with a 
low value for the EPL index, while Portugal and Spain have the highest EPL indices in 
Europe. The EPL index reflects formal regulations. However, there is evidence that the actual 
labour market flexibility is higher in CEE due to weak enforcement of EPL (Eamets and 
Masso (2005)). To show a picture of the institutional differences in the home and host 
countries of MNEs, we present the weighted average measures of EPL and union density for 
the home countries of foreign subsidiaries operating in each country in Appendix D.  
 
We interpret both EPL and union density as proxies of labour market strictness. High union 
coverage is associated with more staggered employment adjustments and should lead to less 
elastic labour demand. We include interactive country-year dummies in the regressions as 
additional controls for country-specific time trends capturing any other country-specific 
developments that may affect the elasticity of labour demand.  
 
We present the results separately for countries from Western Europe and those from Central 
and Eastern Europe as the enforcement of institutions could differ between these country 
groups and the overall cost of employment adjustment is different due to the vast differences 
in wage costs (see Appendix E). EPL tends to be much more persistent over time than union 
coverage does during 2001-2009 in Europe. Union density measures exhibit more dynamism. 
                                                 
11
 Our preferred measure of regulations related to collective bargaining would be union coverage. However, this 
measure is often missing and only irregularly available for many of the countries that our dataset covers and 
therefore we use union density.  
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The results (presented in Table 5 and 6) imply that more strictly regulated labour markets are 
associated with a lower speed of adjustment, lower wage elasticity for employment and lower 
output elasticity for employment among domestic firms, as could be expected. Union density 
declined in most countries and employment contracts become less strictly regulated in 2001-
2009, although changes in EPL were less pronounced. Given these trends, the estimated 
coefficients imply that the reduction in the strictness of labour market regulations was 
associated with increasing elasticity of labour demand in 2001-2009.  
 
Both of the measures we use (union density and EPL) yield similar results for domestic firms, 
since these two forms of labour market regulation tend to be complements: European 
countries that generally have more powerful unions also tend to have stricter EPL. (Please 
refer to the theoretical model developed by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for an explanation of 
why these two institutions should be complements.) It is worth noting that EPL has a 
statistically significant effect on domestic firms’ labour demand in WE, while union density 
has a statistically significant effect on labour demand in the CEE countries. In Western 
European countries, our measure of union power (union density) may yield insignificant 
results because it is not sufficiently correlated with the actual coverage of collective 
bargaining. This is less of a problem in the CEE countries since union agreements are not 
typically extended to non-union members, as is customary in several WE countries (such as 
France, Italy, and Spain), and therefore collective bargaining coverage and trade union 
membership have an almost one-to-one correspondence in CEE.  On the other hand, the 
OECD’s EPL index may be a better measure of the actual strictness of labour regulations in 
WE than in CEE due to better enforcement of labour regulations in WE. In conclusion, the 
insignificance of the estimated effects may stem from measurement errors in the indicators of 
the labour market institutions that we employ. When variables are measured with errors then 
the estimated effects tend to be biased towards zero.     
 
The estimated results imply that a stricter regulatory environment is associated with less 
elastic labour demand for domestic firms. Surprisingly, the foreign firms’ reaction to host 
country institutions is different in WE and in CEE. While foreign firms in WE tend to behave 
even more elastically in the presence of stricter labour market institutions, foreign firms in 
CEE have less elastic labour demand in a stricter institutional environment. There is no good 
theoretical explanation for the estimated effects for WE. One possible explanation is that FDI 
in WE and CEE have different motivations and characters. Another explanation is that as the 
sample of foreign-owned companies in WE is dominated by companies hosted by the UK and 
originating from the US (see also Figure 1), the more inelastic US firms in the UK, with its 
relatively weak EPL, are distorting the relationship. If the UK is removed from the sample of 
foreign firms in WE, the statistically significantly negative effect of the host institutions 
disappears. This specific case illustrates the importance of also controlling for home country 
institutions in the estimations of host country effects, as we do in the following estimations 
(Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Differences in the elasticity of labour demand between FOEs and DOEs could be influenced 
by institutional differences in the home and host countries of multinationals. Table 5 and 
Table 6 test for the relevance of home country institutions in MNEs’ labour demand. These 
results are more consistent across country groups and imply that FDI from countries with 
stricter labour market regulations tends to have less elastic labour demand. This result could 
be interpreted as an indication of spillover effects of institutions from home to host countries 
within firms. However, this interpretation may not be valid, as the decision to invest in a 
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particular country is subject to both home and host institutions, and we are not controlling for 
host country institutions in these regressions. 
 
To address these concerns we introduce a variable which is the ratio of the measures of labour 
market regulations (EPL index, union density) in the host and home countries. This ratio is 
calculated for each subsidiary of a foreign-owned company and is variable over time and 
across all bilateral pairs of home-host relationships. The decision to invest in a company in a 
particular country might be motivated by the difference in host and home institutions. Firms 
in countries with strict regulations might look for investments in countries with weak 
regulations to reduce the costs of employment adjustment caused by demand volatility. Our 
results confirm this hypothesis; the institutional difference is statistically significant in 
manufacturing and the interaction terms indicate that the stricter the home country institutions 
are relative to those of the host country, the more elastic the labour demand is in the foreign-
owned subsidiary of an MNE in the host country compared to the demand of other MNEs. 
This regularity also holds in the opposite direction: the weaker the home country institutions 
are relative to those of the host country, the less elastic the labour demand of MNEs is as it is 
less costly for them to adjust for employment changes in their home country.  
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Table 5. Labour market institutions and the elasticity of labour demand, manufacturing 2001-
09, dependent variable: log(employment) 
 
DOEs in WE 
FOEs in WE 
 
Host institutions Home institutions 
Ratio of host and home 
institutions 
 EPL (3 4) 
wage pre 
UD (3 .) 
wage pre 
EPL (3 .) 
wage pre 
UD (3 .) 
wage pre 
EPL (3 4) 
wage pre 
UD (3 5) 
wage pre 
EPL (3 5) UD (2 .) 
wage pre 
L.lempl 0.621*** 0.947*** 0.759*** 0.855*** 0.792*** 0.740*** 0.828*** 0.842*** 
 (0.154) (0.109) (0.117) (0.092) (0.109) (0.080) (0.072) (0.050) 
L2.lempl  -0.018       
  (0.103)       
lrwage -0.637*** -0.507*** -0.229** -0.137** -0.174 -0.240*** -0.211*** -0.104** 
 (0.184) (0.086) (0.103) (0.069) (0.131) (0.077) (0.062) (0.045) 
L.lrwage 0.334 0.410***       
 (0.232) (0.092)       
lrturn 0.626*** 0.590*** 0.211** 0.176** 0.163* 0.284*** 0.215*** 0.125*** 
 (0.175) (0.090) (0.095) (0.069) (0.093) (0.056) (0.049) (0.029) 
L.lrturn -0.359* -0.512***       
 (0.213) (0.121)       
L.INST*lempl 0.121** -0.284 -0.004 -0.382*** -0.043 0.008 0.017 -0.002 
 (0.056) (0.183) (0.053) (0.141) (0.036) (0.064) (0.022) (0.006) 
L2.INST*lempl  0.056       
  (0.198)       
INST*lrwage 0.001 -0.183 -0.004 -0.296** -0.045 0.170* 0.057* -0.017 
 (0.069) (0.149) (0.054) (0.117) (0.054) (0.097) (0.031) (0.014) 
L.INST*lrwage 0.128 0.180       
 (0.087) (0.188)       
INST*lrturn 0.030 0.125 0.016 0.201* 0.039 -0.121* -0.041* 0.011 
 (0.060) (0.147) (0.048) (0.121) (0.042) (0.072) (0.023) (0.010) 
L.INST*lrturn -0.109 0.060       
 (0.080) (0.209)       
Sector 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 222483 188720 51021 51021 49234 49460 49234 49460 
# of gro~s 33395 33395 7609 7609 7346 7377 7346 7377 
Min.. gr. 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mea.. gr. 6.662 5.651 6.705 6.705 6.702 6.705 6.702 6.705 
Max.. gr. 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 
# of instr 167 209 212 212 168 188 204 256 
Hansen p 0.597 0.897 0.063 0.031 0.225 0.285 0.442 0.214 
AR(1) -13.578 -5.774 -9.316 -8.020 -5.520 -7.910 -9.707 -11.007 
AR(2) 2.523 0.579 -1.915 -1.877 -1.457 -1.858 -1.876 -1.712 
INST in sample 2.664 0.259 2.165 0.282 1.795 0.253 1.595 1.602 
Table 5 (continued).  
 
DOEs in CEE 
FOEs in CEE 
 
Host institutions Home institutions 
Ratio of host and home 
institutions 
 EPL (2 .) UD (2 .) EPL (3 .) 
wage pre 
UD (2 .) EPL (3 5) 
wage pre 
UD (3 .) 
wage pre 
EPL (3 5) 
wage pre 
UD (3 5) 
wage pre 
L.lempl 0.997*** 0.889*** 0.813*** 0.839*** 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.733*** 0.731*** 
 (0.080) (0.067) (0.130) (0.074) (0.102) (0.097) (0.135) (0.112) 
L2.lempl -0.084**        
 (0.035)        
lrwage -0.156 -0.110 -0.341* -0.226*** -0.111 -0.257** -0.331*** -0.306*** 
 (0.112) (0.082) (0.178) (0.065) (0.158) (0.104) (0.126) (0.112) 
lrturn 0.173 0.139* 0.393* 0.223*** 0.216** 0.267*** 0.302*** 0.288*** 
 (0.115) (0.074) (0.233) (0.058) (0.089) (0.062) (0.086) (0.081) 
L.INST*empl -0.008 0.139 0.017 0.169 0.020 0.008 0.012 0.020 
 (0.012) (0.098) (0.037) (0.140) (0.024) (0.180) (0.009) (0.015) 
L2.INST*empl 0.005        
 (0.011)        
INST*lrwage 0.027 0.220** 0.063 0.266** -0.045 0.060 0.029 0.043 
 (0.043) (0.110) (0.072) (0.135) (0.056) (0.208) (0.040) (0.027) 
INST*lrturn -0.024 -0.165** -0.085 -0.220* 0.017 -0.035 -0.017 -0.028* 
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 (0.041) (0.083) (0.098) (0.120) (0.033) (0.143) (0.021) (0.016) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 14922 17890 12758 12758 11057 11173 11057 11173 
# of gro~s 2953 2953 1992 1992 1725 1741 1725 1741 
Min.. gr. 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mea.. gr. 5.053 6.058 6.405 6.405 6.410 6.418 6.410 6.418 
Max.. gr. 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
# of instr 251 258 182 258 182 182 158 158 
Hansen p 0.027 0.975 0.211 0.327 0.186 0.799 0.466 0.680 
AR(1) -8.911 -10.009 -7.762 -10.110 -6.841 -6.585 -4.421 -5.615 
AR(2) -0.119 -1.502 -0.019 0.577 -0.231 -0.232 -0.864 -0.662 
INST in sample 2.277 0.241 2.174 0.219 2.177 0.295 1.174 1.083 
Notes: See notes for Table 4 and footnote no 6 for the list of host countries covered. EPL denotes OECD 
employment protection legislation index and UD union density. 
 
Table 6. Labour market institutions and the elasticity of labour demand, services 2001-09, 
dependent variable: log(employment) 
 
DOEs in WE 
FOEs in WE 
 
Host institutions Home institutions 
Ratio of host and home 
institutions 
 EPL (2 3) 
wage pre 
UD (3 .) 
wage pre 
EPL (3 4) 
wage ex 
UD (2 4) 
wage pre 
EPL (2 4) 
wage pre 
UD (2 4) EPL (3 .) 
UD (3 5) 
wage pre 
L.lempl 0.854*** 0.711*** 0.893*** 0.666*** 0.680*** 0.756*** 0.744*** 0.743*** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.253) (0.146) (0.103) (0.092) (0.078) (0.108) 
lrwage -0.485***  -0.382 -0.083 -0.341* -0.567*** -0.131 -0.270** 
 (0.114)  (0.502) (0.107) (0.197) (0.095) (0.116) (0.135) 
L.lrwage 0.389***     0.404***   
 (0.125)     (0.081)   
lrturn 0.766*** -0.124 0.111 0.113 0.194* 0.500*** 0.043 0.164* 
 (0.148) (0.089) (0.409) (0.102) (0.104) (0.085) (0.067) (0.087) 
L.lrturn -0.576***     -0.443***   
 (0.123)     (0.098)   
L.INST*lempl 0.020 0.249*** -0.017 0.079 0.007 0.235* -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.029) (0.084) (0.077) (0.134) (0.031) (0.124) (0.022) (0.011) 
INST*lrwage -0.008 -0.110 0.029 -0.071 0.021 0.017 -0.016 0.007 
 (0.032) (0.067) (0.181) (0.145) (0.055) (0.130) (0.036) (0.018) 
L.INST*lrwage 0.093**     0.124   
 (0.043)     (0.139)   
INST*lrturn -0.120** 0.034 -0.082 0.034 0.003 -0.011 0.031 0.003 
 (0.052) (0.102) (0.192) (0.117) (0.042) (0.089) (0.024) (0.015) 
L.INST*lrturn 0.081**     -0.125   
 (0.036)     (0.113)   
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 605306 605306 113607 113607 106897 107500 106897 107500 
# of gro~s 96540 96540 17684 17684 16655 16740 16655 16740 
Min.. gr. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mea.. gr. 6.270 6.270 6.424 6.424 6.418 6.422 6.418 6.422 
Max.. gr. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
# of instr 186 212 146 211 211 227 239 187 
Hansen p 0.227 0.060 0.977 0.136 0.500 0.382 0.045 0.042 
AR(1) -13.681 -7.046 -2.400 -4.823 -6.175 -8.605 -8.241 -5.195 
AR(2) -0.985 -0.228 -1.032 -1.902 -1.010 -1.977 -2.071 -1.485 
INST in sample 2.644 0.276 2.145 0.312 1.841 0.252 1.545 1.818 
Table 6 (continued).  
 
DOEs in CEE 
FOEs in CEE 
 
Host institutions Home institutions 
Ratio of host and home 
institutions 
 EPL (3 4) UD (3 4) 
wage ex 
EPL (2 .) UD (2 .) 
wage pre 
EPL (2 .) UD (2 4) 
wage pre 
EPL (2 .) UD (2 3) 
wage pre 
L.lempl 0.792*** 0.653*** 0.764*** 0.597*** 0.731*** 0.646*** 0.799*** 0.733*** 
 (0.132) (0.230) (0.099) (0.129) (0.132) (0.126) (0.099) (0.190) 
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lrwage -0.296 -0.395 -0.108 -0.204** -0.268 -0.299* -0.138 -0.230 
 (0.467) (0.592) (0.078) (0.092) (0.167) (0.172) (0.087) (0.248) 
lrturn 0.333 0.320 0.182*** 0.234*** 0.219** 0.299*** 0.161*** 0.205 
 (0.240) (0.612) (0.066) (0.072) (0.107) (0.099) (0.059) (0.126) 
L.INST*lempl 0.009 0.012 -0.001 0.212* -0.016 0.308* -0.018 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.009) (0.121) (0.021) (0.182) (0.011) (0.019) 
INST*lrwage -0.016 -0.089 -0.015 0.066 0.004 -0.012 -0.011 -0.020 
 (0.180) (0.295) (0.014) (0.117) (0.054) (0.174) (0.022) (0.029) 
INST*lrturn -0.053 0.031 0.002 -0.019 0.001 -0.067 0.008 0.009 
 (0.103) (0.228) (0.017) (0.124) (0.035) (0.116) (0.012) (0.018) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year*country 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 39116 39113 19588 19588 17285 17374 17285 17374 
# of gro~s 6518 6517 3204 3204 2810 2823 2810 2823 
Min.. gr. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mea.. gr. 6.001 6.002 6.114 6.114 6.151 6.154 6.151 6.154 
Max.. gr. 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
# of instr 150 117 258 226 258 182 258 156 
Hansen p 0.068 0.369 0.406 0.787 0.873 0.976 0.842 0.874 
AR(1) -5.047 -1.908 -6.583 -4.629 -4.554 -5.743 -6.350 -3.422 
AR(2) -0.540 -1.314 0.251 0.085 -0.308 -1.018 -0.201 -1.039 
INST in sample 2.171 0.216 2.174 0.213 2.097 0.292 1.268 1.099 
Notes: See notes for Table 4 and footnote no 6 for the list of host countries covered. EPL denotes OECD 
employment protection legislation index and UD union density. 
 
 
The relative distances between the measures of host and home country institutions can explain 
only a small portion of the difference in labour demand elasticities between FOEs and DOEs. 
This result is at least partly caused by the use of measures which do not capture well the 
actual differences in institutions. The OECD’s EPL index is based on formal legislation, 
which does not take account of the fact that law enforcement differs between countries. 
Labour market flexibility depends on norms and cultural attitudes in addition to formalised 
rules, and so the EPL index, which is a combination of different legislative procedures, is only 
a crude measure of the actual strictness of regulations. Union density is also a poor measure 
for capturing variations in actual union power across countries. Collective bargaining 
coverage would be a better measure but unfortunately the complete time series are not 
available for this variable for all the countries that our sample covers and so we could not use 
it.  
 
The inclusion of country-level variables for the firm-level regression estimations together 
with the country-time interactions means that the effect of institutions could also be picked up 
by these dummies. In this context it is relevant that we can still observe statistically 
significant effects for institutions in addition to the country-specific time trends. However, 
because of the measurement problems discussed above, the variables that we employ have 
insufficient variation and do not capture the actual differences in labour market regulations to 
a full extent. Therefore we also carried out additional estimations which should capture the 
effect of institutions. These estimations, which are presented in the following section, can be 
considered as an additional consistency check to the empirical findings described above.  
 
 
5.4. Estimations for two subsamples 
 
We hypothesised that institutional differences in the home and host countries matter for 
labour demand elasticity of multinational enterprises since they can shift the adjustment of 
labour in response to economic shocks to countries where it is easier to make the adjustment. 
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It may be expected that this occurs only when the institutional framework is substantially 
different in the home and host countries, and so the impact of any such reallocation of 
adjustment should be more prevalent when the sample is restricted to a subset of firms for 
which these institutional differences are more pronounced. In order to see whether this is the 
case, we evaluate the elasticities of labour demand for two subsets of our sample. First, the 
subsidiaries of the US companies are compared with domestically owned firms in Western 
European (WE) countries. The US labour market institutions are substantially less strict than 
those of Western Europe, see Appendix E. Second, the subsidiaries of German firms are 
compared with domestic companies in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. 
Germany’s EPL index and union density is not significantly higher than those of the CEE 
countries (Appendix E), but as noted earlier there could be more substantial differences in the 
enforcement of the employment regulations (Eamets and Masso (2005)). Both of these groups 
represent the most important country of origin among foreign companies as US companies 
make up 25% of all the foreign companies in the WE sample and German companies make up 
21% of all the foreign companies in the CEE sample. 
 
 
Table 7. Labour market institutions: Estimations for two subsamples, 2001-09, dependent 
variable: log(employment)  
Notes: See notes for Table 5. 
 
 
Our first exercise focuses on subsidiaries of foreign MNEs from a country with mostly 
unregulated labour markets, the USA, in a group of countries with relatively strict labour 
market institutions, Western Europe.
12
 The results are presented in Table 7. The estimated 
figures indicate that in comparison to domestic companies, the subsidiaries of the US 
multinationals in Western Europe have more persistent labour adjustment. This implies that 
                                                 
12
 Franco, C. (2013) argues that as there is no substantial technological gap between the USA and the OECD 
countries, the US resource-seeking FDI in OECD countries is not looking for natural resources or cheap labour 
but is instead looking for technological resources that could complement or augment the resources at home. 
 US FDI to Western Europe German FDI to Central and Eastern Europe 
 Manufacturing 
(lag 2 2) wage pre 
Services 
lag(3 4) wage pre 
Manufacturing 
(lag 3 5) wage pre 
Services 
(lag 3 5) wage pre 
L.lempl 0.639*** 0.580* 0.942*** 0.897*** 
 (0.073) (0.306) (0.110) (0.177) 
lrwage -0.161* -0.487 -0.178 -0.423** 
 (0.090) (0.441) (0.134) (0.183) 
lrturn 0.252*** 0.435 0.159 0.309** 
 (0.063) (0.291) (0.108) (0.132) 
L.fdiempl 0.221* 0.125 -0.406** -0.432** 
 (0.132) (0.206) (0.186) (0.200) 
fdiwage 0.028 0.271 -0.195 -0.043 
 (0.105) (0.344) (0.162) (0.199) 
fditurn -0.067 -0.257 0.230 0.150 
 (0.089) (0.266) (0.141) (0.151) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year*country dummies yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 235078 629588 20759 42903 
# of gro~s 35243 100318 3398 7130 
Min.. gr. 3 3 3 3 
Mea.. gr. 6.670 6.276 6.109 6.017 
Max.. gr. 8 8 8 8 
# of instr 153 168 158 158 
Hansen p 0.021 0.884 0.772 0.416 
AR(1) -9.252 -2.075 -7.348 -5.025 
AR(2) 1.102 -0.578 -1.737 -1.797 
Share of FO in sample 0.054 0.039 0.138 0.088 
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when the country of origin has a less regulated labour market environment, the subsidiaries of 
an MNE have less elastic labour demand than local companies in their host countries as it is 
less costly for the MNE to adjust labour input in the country of origin. The effects on the 
long-term and short-term wage and output elasticities of labour demand are not statistically 
significant. 
 
In the second case, we assess the differences in labour demand elasticities between the 
subsidiaries of German firms in CEE countries and domestically owned firms. The results are 
in accordance with our hypothesis in this subsample as well. The speed of adjustment is 
substantially higher in the subsidiaries of German-owned firms than in the local companies in 
CEE. This suggests that foreign subsidiaries originating from home countries with a relatively 
strict institutional environment have a substantially higher speed of adjustment than domestic 
companies as it is more costly for the MNEs to adjust labour inputs in their home country. 
The effects on the long-term and short-term wage and output elasticities of labour demand are 
not statistically significant. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the current study is to analyse how employment volatility differs in companies 
with foreign and domestic owners. Our analysis is based on an Amadeus firm-level dataset 
which covers more than 20 European countries. We derive employment volatility on the basis 
of standard labour supply and demand functions and demonstrate that it can be expressed as a 
combination of two components. The first component captures volatility due to changes in 
labour demand elasticity. Given a non-zero elasticity of labour supply, the elasticity of labour 
demand is positively related with employment volatility. The second component captures 
volatility in employment due to economic shocks. The more exposed a firm is to external 
shocks, the higher its employment volatility is. This decomposition indicates that the presence 
of foreign-owned companies may lead to higher employment volatility because FOEs react 
more sensitively to wage changes in the host country or because they are more tightly 
integrated in international markets and are per se more exposed to external shocks.  
 
The estimations of conditional volatility based on propensity score matching yield the result 
that employment tends to be more volatile in the subsidiaries of foreign-owned MNEs than in 
domestically owned firms. However, larger volatility in foreign-owned enterprises is not 
unanimously caused by their more elastic labour demand. Our estimations imply that labour 
demand can be either more or less elastic in subsidiaries of foreign-owned multinationals, 
depending on the institutional environments of their home and host countries. When FDI 
originates from a region with a more flexible institutional environment (e.g. from the USA to 
Western European countries) then the elasticity of labour demand is smaller in absolute value 
in FOEs than in DOEs. In the opposite case (e.g. when FDI is originating from Germany to 
CEE countries) the elasticity of labour demand is higher.  
 
A potential explanation for this finding is that in countries with rigid labour market 
regulations, multinational companies avoid changing domestic employment in response to 
economic shocks and instead use other margins of adjustment. They are more likely to do this 
than domestic firms are since it is easier for multinational companies to substitute between 
factor inputs. In addition to adjusting via alternative margins, they may also shift the 
adjustment of labour in response to economic shocks to subsidiaries which are located in 
countries with less regulated labour markets. Alternatively, multinational firms may choose 
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the host countries where they establish subsidiaries by looking at the labour market 
institutions: if they operate in sectors that have highly volatile demand then they are more 
likely to move to countries with a flexible institutional environment. In either case, the 
presence of foreign-owned firms would have an amplifying effect on the elasticity of labour 
demand in countries with flexible labour market institutions, whereas it would have a 
dampening effect in countries with rigid institutions.   
 
Due to the limitations of the Amadeus data we can only study labour adjustment via the 
intensive margin, i.e by assessing changes in employment in incumbent companies. 
Employment may also be more volatile in foreign-owned multinationals than in domestically 
owned firms as they are more likely to establish and close down subsidiaries. The second of 
these two margins has been tested in the empirical literature and it has mostly been confirmed 
that FOEs are more “footloose”, i.e. they have higher conditional exit rates, than DOEs (e.g. 
Bernard and Sjöholm (2003); Görg and Strobl (2003) Alvarez and Görg (2009); Wagner and 
Weche Gelübke (2011)). Investigation of the role that labour market institutions play in the 
entry and exit decisions of foreign multinationals would be an interesting area for further 
research that would complement the findings of the current study.  
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of domestically and foreign-owned firms in WE countries, 
2001-09
 
 Domestically owned Foreign-owned 
 Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. 
Employment 210.3 3597.2 958941 431.8 3873.9 190154 
Real wages (th of EUR) 1384.0 11659.3 958941 5212.9 25066.6 190154 
Real turnover (th of EUR) 261317.7 4830482.0 958941 682999.7 3958836.0 190154 
Real capital per employee (th 
of EUR) 
1768.8 39547.9 958640 4158.3 78291.3 190093 
Real labour productivity (th of 
EUR) 
6266.4 58843.9 958941 27686.7 228795.4 190154 
Age of firm 23.8 15.5 957385 27.2 19.5 189819 
No of subsidiaries  1.76 16.64 958941 2.49 20.80 190154 
No of shareholders  2.45 4.85 912449 1.87 3.19 176160 
Group’s employment  4936.8 8151.0 958941 2754.7 4599.2 190154 
Share of manufacturing 0.267 0.443 958941 0.309 0.462 190154 
Note: The following countries are covered: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
Source: authors’ own calculations from the Amadeus dataset. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of domestically and foreign-owned firms in CEE countries, 
2001-09
 
 Domestically owned Foreign-owned 
 Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No of Obs. 
Employment 161.2 621.8 66526 248.7 883.6 37561 
Real wages (th of EUR) 9.9 8.8 66526 13.1 15.8 37561 
Real turnover (th of EUR) 8525.7 26981.0 66526 13827.2 36123.8 37561 
Real capital per employee (th 
of EUR) 
47.3 279.2 66457 55.9 443.3 37556 
Real labour productivity (th of 
EUR) 
122.7 279.9 66526 199.1 704.5 37561 
Age of firm 16.8 5.4 62806 15.3 4.6 35906 
No of subsidiaries  0.49 2.30 66526 0.32 1.60 37561 
No of shareholders  2.07 1.67 65752 1.43 0.92 36834 
Group’s employment  4301.0 7221.3 66526 2874.9 4893.5 37561 
Share of manufacturing 0.314 0.464 66526 0.393 0.488 37561 
Note: The following countries are covered: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
Source: authors’ own calculations from the Amadeus dataset.  
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Appendix B. Probit model used in propensity score matching. 
 
Table 1. Probit model used in propensity score matching, marginal effects, manufacturing, 
2005 
 Dependent: Pr(Foreign owned=1, domestically owned=0) 
 Turnover volatility Employment volatility 
 WE CEE WE CEE 
Log(age of firm) -0.012*** -0.182*** -0.013*** -0.181*** 
Log(employment) 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 
No of subsidiaries -0.001*** -0.011** -0.001*** -0.014** 
Log(no of shareholders) -0.050*** -0.191*** -0.050*** -0.191*** 
Log(group’s employment) -0.032*** -0.061*** -0.032*** -0.058*** 
Log(capital per employee) -0.004*** 0.028*** -0.005*** 0.029*** 
Log(labour productivity) 0.016*** 0.010 0.017*** 0.012* 
Industries
a)
, manufacture of (base: food):     
beverages 0.021 0.094* 0.018 0.088* 
tobacco products 0.149** -0.039 0.151** -0.034 
textiles -0.040*** 0.119*** -0.040*** 0.130*** 
wearing apparel -0.038*** 0.212*** -0.041*** 0.223*** 
leather and related products -0.015 0.045 -0.012 -0.000 
wood and of products of wood -0.044*** 0.095** -0.046*** 0.098** 
paper and paper products 0.062*** 0.183*** 0.063*** 0.181*** 
printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
-0.018* 0.014 -0.018* 0.016 
coke and refined petroleum products 0.186*** -0.093 0.169*** -0.060 
chemicals and chemical products 0.204*** 0.115*** 0.209*** 0.133*** 
basic pharmaceutical products 0.255*** 0.244*** 0.261*** 0.263*** 
rubber and plastic products 0.109*** 0.219*** 0.109*** 0.225*** 
other non-metallic mineral products 0.008 0.140*** 0.008 0.152*** 
basic metals 0.036*** -0.022 0.037*** -0.013 
fabricated metal products 0.035*** 0.119*** 0.036*** 0.125*** 
computer, electronic and optical products 0.186*** 0.128*** 0.191*** 0.138*** 
electrical equipment 0.128*** 0.249*** 0.128*** 0.241*** 
machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.128*** 0.092*** 0.128*** 0.092*** 
motor vehicles 0.165*** 0.306*** 0.164*** 0.312*** 
other transport equipment 0.002 -0.049 0.003 -0.033 
furniture -0.048*** 0.092** -0.050*** 0.095** 
other manufacturing 0.095*** 0.131** 0.096*** 0.137*** 
repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment 
0.072*** -0.095** 0.076*** -0.085** 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs. 47124 7486 45705 7362 
Pseudo R
2
 0.264 0.233 0.265 0.239 
Predicted Y 0.124 0.379 0.125 0.374 
Actual Y 0.190 0.402 0.191 0.399 
Notes: See notes for Table 2. 
a) 
The list of NACE Rev. 2 industries can be found at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF 
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Table 2. Probit model used in propensity score matching, marginal effects, services, 2005 
 Dependent: Pr(Foreign owned=1, domestically owned=0) 
 Turnover volatility Employment volatility 
 WE CEE WE CEE 
Log(age of firm) -0.013*** -0.121*** -0.014*** -0.120*** 
Log(employment) 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 
No of subsidiaries -0.000*** 0.002 -0.000*** -0.000 
Log(no of shareholders) -0.034*** -0.157*** -0.033*** -0.160*** 
Log(group’s employment) -0.017*** -0.030*** -0.017*** -0.028*** 
Log(capital per employee) -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007** 
Log(labour productivity) 0.011*** 0.036*** 0.012*** 0.039*** 
Industriesa), (base: Electricity, gas, steam):     
Water collection, treatment and supply 0.031* -0.202*** 0.038* -0.187*** 
Sewerage -0.026 -0.231*** -0.026 -0.218*** 
Waste collection, treatment and disposal -0.049*** -0.031 -0.048*** -0.011 
Remediation activities and other waste 
management 
-0.065*** -0.121 -0.066*** -0.099 
Construction of buildings -0.058*** -0.057* -0.060*** -0.041 
Civil engineering -0.048*** -0.090*** -0.049*** -0.072** 
Specialised construction activities -0.056*** -0.060* -0.056*** -0.045 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles 
-0.029*** 0.002 -0.029*** 0.024 
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles 0.088*** 0.172*** 0.088*** 0.192*** 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles -0.042*** 0.075** -0.041*** 0.095*** 
Land transport and transport via pipelines -0.030*** -0.044 -0.029*** -0.035 
Water transport 0.025* 0.024 0.028* 0.049 
Air transport -0.027** -0.005 -0.028** 0.032 
Warehousing and support activities for 
transportation 
0.043*** 0.125*** 0.044*** 0.146*** 
Postal and courier activities -0.027* 0.207 -0.022 0.203 
Accommodation -0.004 -0.052 -0.002 -0.047 
Food and beverage service activities -0.050*** -0.033 -0.049*** -0.017 
Publishing activities 0.009 0.149*** 0.009 0.166*** 
Motion picture, video and television 
programme production 
0.018 0.166** 0.021 0.211** 
Programming and broadcasting activities -0.015 -0.022 -0.013 0.008 
Telecommunications 0.064*** 0.231*** 0.071*** 0.226*** 
Computer programming, consultancy and 
related activities 
0.093*** 0.217*** 0.098*** 0.247*** 
Information service activities 0.033** 0.047 0.035** 0.101 
Financial service activities, except insurance 
and pension funding 
0.104*** 0.309*** 0.110*** 0.349*** 
Activities auxiliary to financial services and 
insurance activities 
0.056*** 0.163*** 0.057*** 0.214*** 
Real estate activities 0.006 0.055 0.009 0.063* 
Legal and accounting activities -0.027*** 0.113* -0.021** 0.146** 
Activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities 
0.091*** 0.296*** 0.094*** 0.354*** 
Architectural and engineering activities; 
technical testing and analysis 
0.024** 0.042 0.023** 0.067 
Scientific research and development 0.089*** -0.195*** 0.106*** -0.179*** 
Advertising and market research 0.081*** 0.277*** 0.086*** 0.314*** 
Other professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
0.046*** 0.164* 0.051*** 0.239*** 
Veterinary activities -0.068***  -0.074***  
Rental and leasing activities -0.007 0.198*** -0.008 0.214*** 
Employment activities 0.003 0.229* 0.005 0.236* 
Travel agency, tour operator reservation 
service and related activities 
0.017 0.028 0.017 0.044 
Security and investigation activities -0.021* -0.142*** -0.020 -0.135*** 
Services to buildings and landscape activities -0.070*** -0.172*** -0.071*** -0.157*** 
Office administrative, office support and other 
business support activities 
0.064*** 0.160*** 0.067*** 0.180*** 
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Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
-0.069*** -0.023 -0.068*** 0.035 
Education -0.054*** -0.213*** -0.053*** -0.195*** 
Human health activities -0.052*** -0.179*** -0.050*** -0.178*** 
Residential care activities -0.076***  -0.076***  
Social work activities without accommodation -0.089***  -0.091***  
Creative, arts and entertainment activities -0.056*** -0.090 -0.056*** -0.121 
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural 
activities 
-0.076***  -0.074***  
Gambling and betting activities -0.037*** -0.156*** -0.041*** -0.142** 
Sports activities and amusement and recreation 
activities 
-0.048*** -0.238*** -0.047*** -0.219*** 
Activities of membership organisations -0.080***  -0.078***  
Repair of computers and personal and 
household goods 
0.005 0.043 0.014 0.048 
Other personal service activities -0.004 -0.033 -0.002 0.021 
Activities of households as employers of 
domestic personnel 
-0.052  -0.051  
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of obs. 152066 14048 143462 13745 
Pseudo R
2
 0.227 0.255 0.226 0.259 
Predicted Y 0.090 0.303 0.092 0.297 
Actual Y 0.146 0.340 0.148 0.335 
Notes: See notes for Table 2. 
a) 
The list of NACE Rev. 2 industries can be found at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF 
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Appendix C. Labour demand equation estimates of FOEs and DOEs: country by country 
Table 1. Labour demand estimates of FOEs and DOEs, manufacturing 2001-2009 
Table 1 is continued on the next page.  
 
 
Belgium 
(lag 3 5) 
Finland 
(lag 3 4) 
France 
(lag 2 .) 
wage pre 
Germany 
(lag 2 3) 
Italy 
(lag 3 5) 
wage pre 
Netherlands 
(lag 3 4) 
Norway 
(lag 3 5)  
sec as instr 
Portugal 
(lag 3 4) 
wage pre 
Spain 
(lag 3 3) 
wage pre 
Sweden 
(lag 3 .) 
UK 
(lag 3 5) 
L.log(empl) 0.975*** 0.795*** 0.695*** 0.876*** 0.761*** 0.708*** 0.733*** 0.860*** 1.015** 0.800*** 1.018*** 
 (0.241) (0.156) (0.110) (0.148) (0.104) (0.218) (0.073) (0.100) (0.399) (0.147) (0.133) 
L2.log(empl) -0.123 0.004  -0.098*     -0.114 0.039 -0.156 
 (0.156) (0.145)  (0.055)     (0.332) (0.134) (0.115) 
Log(rwage) -0.088 -0.197* -0.306** -0.301** -0.894*** -0.308 -0.253*** -0.143* 0.619 -0.122 -0.101 
 (0.120) (0.114) (0.128) (0.141) (0.043) (0.254) (0.095) (0.085) (0.546) (0.075) (0.072) 
L.log(rwage)     0.741***    -0.680   
     (0.096)    (0.589)   
Log(rturn) 0.089 0.226** 0.241*** 0.178* 0.745*** 0.312* 0.302*** 0.174** 0.180 0.168*** 0.126** 
(0.090) (0.089) (0.070) (0.098) (0.084) (0.162) (0.082) (0.073) (0.133) (0.047) (0.057) 
L.log(rturn)     -0.530***       
     (0.103)       
L.FO*log(empl) -0.308 0.105 0.158* 0.102 -0.235* 0.030 -0.112 0.077 -0.392 -0.146 -0.029 
(0.256) (0.246) (0.094) (0.181) (0.132) (0.222) (0.195) (0.108) (0.416) (0.198) (0.143) 
L2.FO*log(empl) 0.265 -0.046  -0.100     0.321 0.172 0.052 
(0.201) (0.198)  (0.078)     (0.343) (0.197) (0.135) 
FO*log(rwage) -0.193* 0.059 0.173 0.101 -0.020 0.196 -0.118 0.073 -0.139 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.116) (0.162) (0.111) (0.156) (0.042) (0.252) (0.247) (0.104) (0.393) (0.035) (0.080) 
L.FO*log(rwage)     -0.226*    0.001   
     (0.117)    (0.286)   
FO*log(rturn) 0.132 -0.054 -0.135* -0.034 0.079 -0.084 0.100 -0.071 0.102 0.008 0.002 
 (0.092) (0.134) (0.077) (0.121) (0.085) (0.178) (0.211) (0.087) (0.201) (0.040) (0.067) 
L.FO*log(rturn)     0.140       
     (0.089)       
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 11123 4414 20695 3590 38471 2312 7112 1241 111476 13636 29736 
# of groups 1716 806 3466 900 5986 364 1795 254 18420 2347 4890 
Min obs. gr. 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
Mean obs. gr. 6.482 5.476 5.971 3.989 6.427 6.352 3.962 4.886 6.052 5.810 6.081 
Max obs. gr. 7 7 8 7 8 8 6 8 7 7 7 
# of instruments 133 109 186 121 118 110 106 98 75 169 133 
Hansen p 0.858 0.321 0.677 0.653 0.758 0.851 0.214 0.891 0.942 0.176 0.298 
AR(1) test -2.615 -2.785 -7.471 -3.190 -6.505 -3.409 -8.407 -2.206 -1.840 -2.892 -5.291 
AR(2) test -1.795 -1.500 -1.611 -0.598 1.152 0.383 -0.451 0.450 0.790 -0.765 0.064 
FDI in sample 0.379 0.247 0.403 0.368 0.167 0.486 0.066 0.137 0.066 0.103 0.470 
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Table 1 (continued).  
 
 
Bulgaria 
(lag 3 4) 
Czech R. 
(lag 2 3) 
Estonia 
(lag 2 4) 
Poland 
(lag 3 .) 
Romania 
(lag 2 .) 
Slovakia 
(lag 2 2) wage pre 
Slovenia 
(lag 2 4) wage ex, 
size*year 
L.log(empl) 0.798*** 0.746*** 0.860*** 0.852*** 0.891*** 0.791*** 0.776*** 
 (0.183) (0.117) (0.255) (0.117) (0.136) (0.110) (0.184) 
L2.log(empl)  0.001 -0.156     
  (0.029) (0.097)     
Log(rwage) -0.222 -0.270*** -0.285** -0.221* -0.199 -0.265** -0.346 
 (0.179) (0.098) (0.127) (0.114) (0.136) (0.122) (0.399) 
Log(rturn) 0.328** 0.184** 0.301* 0.196* 0.218* 0.146* 0.163 
 (0.128) (0.080) (0.160) (0.104) (0.112) (0.081) (0.149) 
L.FO*log(empl) 0.041 0.070 -0.102 -0.028 0.052 -0.038 -0.270* 
 (0.149) (0.125) (0.231) (0.120) (0.177) (0.294) (0.160) 
L2.FO*log(empl)  0.057 0.080     
  (0.039) (0.113)     
FO*log(rwage) -0.009 0.125 -0.044 -0.002 0.111 -0.047 -0.039 
 (0.178) (0.104) (0.213) (0.129) (0.134) (0.176) (0.229) 
FO*log(rturn) -0.005 -0.122 0.011 0.003 -0.091 0.042 0.102 
 (0.122) (0.094) (0.174) (0.096) (0.128) (0.188) (0.171) 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 3518 4661 1585 11744 2230 536 5696 
# of groups 589 850 304 1967 313 85 908 
Min obs. gr. 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 
Mean obs. gr. 5.973 5.484 5.214 5.971 7.125 6.306 6.273 
Max obs. gr. 8 7 6 8 8 8 7 
# of instruments 110 121 126 170 218 82 114 
Hansen p 0.445 0.059 0.621 0.108 0.964 0.645 0.670 
AR(1) test -3.852 -5.489 -2.319 -8.533 -4.403 -2.780 -3.560 
AR(2) test 0.520 -0.089 -1.487 -1.506 -1.936 1.121 -1.045 
FDI in sample 0.320 0.786 0.539 0.333 0.706 0.670 0.129 
Notes: System GMM estimations. Dependent variable: log(employment), 2001-2009. Two-step estimators with Windmeijer-corrected cluster robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Lagged employment and turnover are treated as endogenous; wages are treated as endogenous, pre-determined or exogenous dependent on specification tests. 
Lag length of GMM type instruments are reported at the top of the column. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
respectively.  
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Table 2. Labour demand estimates of FOEs and DOEs, services 2001-2009 
Table 2 is continued on the next page.  
 
 Belgium 
(lag 2 2) 
Finland 
(lag 3 4) 
wage pre, 
sec as instr 
France 
(lag 2 .) 
wage ex, 
size*year 
Germany 
(lag 2 3) 
wage ex, 
size*year 
Italy 
(lag 2 4) 
Netherlands 
(lag 2 .) 
wage pre 
Norway 
(lag 3 5) 
wage pre, 
sec as instr 
Portugal 
(lag 3 4) sec 
as instr 
Spain 
(lag 3 5) 
wage ex, 
size*year 
Sweden 
(lag 2 2) 
wage ex, 
size*year 
UK 
(lag 3 .) 
wage ex, 
size*year 
L.log(empl) 0.724*** 0.760*** 0.808*** 0.791*** 0.420*** 0.561*** 0.774*** 0.827*** 0.772*** 0.766*** 0.426* 
 (0.213) (0.089) (0.037) (0.140) (0.087) (0.107) (0.066) (0.090) (0.084) (0.034) (0.249) 
L2.log(empl) -0.005   -0.096**       0.122 
 (0.096)   (0.038)       (0.215) 
Log(rwage) -0.833*** -0.333*** -0.629*** -0.144** -0.828*** -0.371*** -0.139** -0.167** -0.291*** -0.207*** -0.264 
 (0.172) (0.114) (0.072) (0.058) (0.055) (0.082) (0.061) (0.081) (0.111) (0.058) (0.183) 
L.log(rwage) 0.567***  0.540***  0.410***     0.064  
 (0.185)  (0.089)  (0.072)     (0.062)  
Log(rturn) 
 
0.425*** 0.334*** 0.710*** 0.139** 0.461*** 0.258*** 0.284*** 0.205** 0.395*** 0.563*** 0.201 
(0.146) (0.095) (0.046) (0.057) (0.096) (0.096) (0.061) (0.084) (0.071) (0.036) (0.170) 
L.log(rturn) -0.359***  -0.593***  -0.213**     -0.422***  
 (0.139)  (0.054)  (0.108)     (0.041)  
L.FO* log(empl) -0.044 0.058 0.042 -0.024 0.091 0.255* 0.054 -0.130* -0.185 0.038 -0.020 
(0.212) (0.069) (0.034) (0.122) (0.127) (0.144) (0.131) (0.070) (0.136) (0.045) (0.305) 
L2.FO*log(empl) -0.183   -0.082       -0.046 
(0.147)   (0.055)       (0.247) 
FO*log(rwage) 0.015 0.259*** -0.003 -0.069 -0.035 0.202* -0.032 -0.084 -0.067 -0.010 0.066 
 (0.205) (0.095) (0.104) (0.110) (0.055) (0.104) (0.097) (0.070) (0.181) (0.026) (0.205) 
L.FO*log(rwage) 0.003  0.046  -0.023     -0.009  
(0.181)  (0.110)  (0.107)     (0.026)  
FO*log(rturn) 0.232 -0.193*** -0.078 0.070 0.036 -0.181* 0.012 0.087 0.054 -0.132** -0.036 
 (0.174) (0.075) (0.059) (0.093) (0.104) (0.103) (0.092) (0.059) (0.130) (0.061) (0.157) 
L.FO*log(rturn) -0.149  0.039  -0.024     0.137**  
(0.157)  (0.064)  (0.138)     (0.058)  
Sector dummies yes yes no no yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 27125  56306 9277 44915 5332 44634 2312 343149 59948 87274 
# of groups 4369 2512 9709 2302 7651 885 11331 483 50756 8908 15066 
Min obs. gr. 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Mean obs. gr. 6.209 6.024 5.799 4.030 5.870 6.025 3.939 4.787 6.761 6.730 5.793 
Max obs. gr. 7 8 8 7 8 8 6 8 8 8 7 
# of instruments 85 148 174 106 158 186 137 149 94 90 138 
Hansen p 0.417 0.023 0.306 0.273 0.034 0.236 0.377 0.440 0.089 0.011 0.637 
AR(1) test -4.578 -7.772 -14.595 -5.604 -4.169 -3.937 -12.187 -5.497 -9.265 -27.612 -1.706 
AR(2) test 0.869 -2.876 1.471 0.419 0.207 -0.420 1.147 -1.454 0.070 1.842 -1.301 
FDI in sample 0.408 0.264 0.285 0.223 0.154 0.334 0.071 0.126 0.058 0.124 0.372 
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Table 2 (continued).  
 
 
Bulgaria 
(lag 2 4) wage pre 
Czech R. 
(lag 2 2) 
Estonia 
(lag 3 4) wage 
pre 
Poland 
(lag 2 .) wage 
pre 
Romania 
(lag 3 5) wage pre 
Slovakia 
(lag 2 3) 
Slovenia 
(lag 3 .) wage ex 
L.log(empl) 0.860*** 0.671 0.840* 0.559*** 0.610* 0.665*** 0.719*** 
 (0.099) (0.484) (0.438) (0.124) (0.324) (0.141) (0.179) 
L2.log(empl)    0.089***    
    (0.034)    
Log(rwage) -0.224* -0.741*** -0.282 -0.656*** -0.258 -0.261* -0.219 
 (0.126) (0.164) (0.228) (0.085) (0.195) (0.136) (0.211) 
L.log(rwage)  0.402 0.015 0.276***    
  (0.393) (0.222) (0.094)    
Log(rturn) 0.178** 0.390** 0.633*** 0.386*** 0.246 0.230* 0.310*** 
 (0.081) (0.175) (0.158) (0.071) (0.206) (0.120) (0.101) 
L.log(rturn)  -0.241 -0.418 -0.070    
  (0.178) (0.260) (0.087)    
L.FO* log(empl) -0.358** -0.127 -0.161 0.084 0.115 -0.018 -0.390 
 (0.153) (0.189) (0.473) (0.128) (0.325) (0.179) (0.318) 
L2.FO*log(empl)    -0.034    
    (0.045)    
FO*log(rwage) -0.012 0.007 0.043 0.246** 0.085 -0.107 0.013 
 (0.163) (0.200) (0.251) (0.097) (0.242) (0.164) (0.346) 
L.FO*log(rwage)  0.142 -0.135 -0.134    
  (0.276) (0.231) (0.095)    
FO*log(rturn) 0.123 0.097 -0.478** -0.216** 0.041 0.061 0.102 
 (0.095) (0.263) (0.204) (0.093) (0.209) (0.118) (0.248) 
L.FO*log(rturn)  -0.146 0.635* 0.107    
  (0.157) (0.349) (0.105)    
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
# of obs. 6280 8009 5678 23681 2732 949 6815 
# of groups 1020 1359 920 4744 397 178 1139 
Min obs. gr. 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
Mean obs. gr. 6.157 5.893 6.172 4.992 6.882 5.331 5.983 
Max obs. gr. 8 8 7 7 8 8 7 
# of instruments 142 92 79 183 118 120 89 
Hansen p 0.005 0.257 0.042 0.012 0.256 0.333 0.016 
AR(1) test -6.645 -1.542 -2.631 -2.533 -2.946 -4.836 -3.519 
AR(2) test 1.084 -0.095 -0.683 -1.775 -0.503 -0.428 -2.529 
FDI in sample 0.276 0.755 0.433 0.213 0.787 0.427 0.347 
Notes: See notes for Table 1. 
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Appendix D. Estimated speed of adjustment and long-run elasticities: country by country 
 
 
Figure 1. Manufacturing firms speed of adjustment, long-run wage and output elasticities. 
Note: Based on coefficients presented in Appendix C Table 1. * indicates statistically significant difference 
between domestic and foreign firms at the 10% level of significance; statistical significance of difference in 
long-run elasticities is based on non-linear Wald-type test using testnl command in Stata. 
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Figure 2. Services firms speed of adjustment, long-run wage and output elasticities. 
Note: Based on coefficients presented in Appendix C Table 2. * indicates statistically significant difference 
between domestic and foreign firms at the 10% level of significance; statistical significance of difference in 
long-run elasticities is based on non-linear Wald-type test using testnl command in Stata. 
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Appendix E. Labour market institutions in host and home countries, average for 2001-2009 
 
 Average EPL 
Average EPL of 
home countries of 
foreign firms 
Average union 
density 
Average union 
density of home 
countries of 
foreign firms 
 
Sample countries 
Austria 2.233 2.177 0.343 0.285 
Belgium 2.500 1.964 0.522 0.221 
Denmark 1.900 1.915 0.738 0.342 
Finland 2.105 1.991 0.719 0.424 
France 2.889 1.771 0.078 0.279 
Germany 2.411 1.741 0.222 0.248 
Greece 2.954 2.025 0.247 0.250 
Italy 2.376 1.950 0.338 0.225 
Netherlands 2.239 1.678 0.202 0.245 
Norway 2.697 1.927 0.542 0.446 
Portugal 3.387 2.438 0.212 0.200 
Spain 3.025 2.062 0.155 0.233 
Sweden 2.433 1.843 0.745 0.391 
UK 1.094 1.635 0.286 0.219 
Bulgaria 2.000 2.283 0.238 0.282 
Czech Rep. 1.990 2.084 0.205 0.250 
Estonia 2.290 2.211 0.099 0.520 
Hungary 1.676 2.127 0.179 0.250 
Latvia 2.500 2.141 0.185 0.388 
Lithuania 2.800 2.113 0.131 0.399 
Poland 2.061 2.145 0.198 0.271 
Romania 2.676 2.182 0.355 0.271 
Slovakia 1.874 1.950 0.243 0.246 
Slovenia 2.570 2.150 0.345 0.267 
 
Home countries of FDI in sample countries 
All countries 1.879  0.261  
USA 0.650  0.121  
Sources: Amadeus data, ICTWSS database by Visser (2011), OECD StatExtracts. 
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Appendix F. Monthly average labour cost, wages and salaries (including apprentices), 2008  
 
 
Wage cost in Euros, per employee in full-
time units 
 
European Union (27 countries) 3 141 
European Union (15 countries) 3 682 
CEE10 average 1046 
Austria 3 847 
Belgium 4 195 
Denmark 4 539 
Finland 3 712 
France 4 110 
Germany  3 846 
Greece 2 391 
Italy 3 430 
Netherlands 4 203 
Norway 5 918 
Portugal 1 742 
Spain 2 808 
Sweden 4 428 
United Kingdom 3 677 
Bulgaria 374 
Czech Republic 1 323 
Estonia 1 149 
Latvia 886 
Lithuania 848 
Hungary 1 164 
Poland 1 089 
Romania 648 
Slovakia 991 
Slovenia 1 991 
Note: 10 employees or more. 
Source: Eurostat, LCS 2008 [lc_n08costot_r2] 
